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DEBUNKING THE DEATHBED ANALYSIS: 
EXPLORING A NEW APPROACH TO ARTICLE 3 
HEALTH CASES 
Meredith Heim 
ABSTRACT—This essay will explore Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it has been applied to deportation 
cases of persons in poor health, with the ultimate goal of answering the 
following question: Whether the deportation of a person to a place where she 
or he will not receive adequate health care should constitute a violation of 
ECHR Article 3. Further, this article will suggest how the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the national courts below them can better 
review such cases in order to provide more meaningful protection to those 
inflicted. In doing so, this essay specifically finds that (i) the ECtHR 
incorrectly applied Article 3 to cases of poor health and deportation in the 
past, (ii) the ECtHR still needs to further clarify an appropriate standard for 
these cases, (iii) the national courts, particularly in the United Kingdom, are 
incorrectly following old precedent, (iv) the ECtHR needs to explore all 
claims presented to it in these cases, including claims of Article 2 and 8 
violations, and (v) the ECtHR should shift more toward the American 
Convention on Human Rights approach to Article 3 health cases in better 
aligning with the European policies on the right to health. Ultimately, these 
conclusions should assist in establishing sound justification for a relaxation 
of the current standard used in Article 3 health cases in Europe today. 
Note that this article was written as the Savran decision was being 
handed down, so an in-depth analysis on Savran is absent. Savran was 
decided in October 2019, after this article was started and shortly before the 
article was finalized. Savran applied Paposhvili to mental health situations, 
which is a significant development. In the section ‘Recommendations for 
Future Research,’ this article calls for an examination of the role that mental 
health plays in ECtHR decisions and how the court’s treatment of mental 
health has changed over the years. Savran should help inform, and be a part 
of, this future research. 
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Waterboarding, starvation, flogging – these are the obvious thoughts 
that cross one’s mind when thinking of the Article 3 provision of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which protects citizens 
from undergoing any form of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.1 However, in 1997, the European Court on Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) expanded the traditional meaning2 of an Article 3 violation to 
apply to deportation cases of seriously ill persons to places where they would 
likely receive inadequate health care.3 That said, the meaning and application 
of this expansion was effectively limited to only “very exceptional 
 
 1 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, art. 3 (Nov. 4, 1950), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 2 See, e.g., Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94, (April 24, 2003); Soering v. U.K., App. No. 
14038/88, (July 7, 1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57619%22]}; Ireland 
v. U. K., App. No. 5310/71, (Jan. 18, 1978), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
57506%22]}; see also, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Manual on Refugee Protection and the 
ECHR Part 2.1 — Fact Sheet on Article 3 (Mar. 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/3ead2d262 
[hereinafter ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet]. 
 3 See generally, D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96, ¶ 53 (May 2, 1997), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58035%22]}. This inadequacy in care 
includes both a lack in necessary medical treatment and in personal support for their illness. Id. 
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circumstances”,4 which courts consistently interpreted very narrowly and 
eventually limited to only “deathbed” cases.5 
Subsequently finding only one other violation of Article 3 in such cases 
over a twenty-year period,6 the ECtHR essentially nullified the original 
protections promulgated in its 1997 decision. Nevertheless, recent 
developments in Article 3 health cases present uncertainty as to the true 
application of Article 3,7 particularly in the United Kingdom.8 To briefly 
explain, the ECtHR’s recent ruling in Paposhvili v. Belgium issued one of 
the greatest changes to Article 3 health cases since the previously mentioned 
1997 decision, D v. United Kingdom. In Paposhvili, the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber broadened the types of health cases which trigger Article 3 from 
the previously restricting standard requiring the applicant to be “terminally 
ill or at an advanced stage of their illness” to cases where the absence of 
appropriate treatment exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and 
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering 
 
 4 Id. at ¶ 54. 
 5 See Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10, ¶ 183 (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-169662%22]} (broadening Article 3 violations 
to apply when the absence of appropriate treatment exposes the individual to a “serious, rapid and 
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction 
in life expectancy.”); N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05, (May 27, 2008), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-86490%22]} (observing the courts 
consistently narrow application since D. v. U.K.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] 
EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.) 
(limiting the application of Article 3 to health cases only when the deathbed test is applicable, with 
deathbed referring to “terminally ill” or at an “advanced stage of their illness”); see also Julia Lowis, 
Establishing a breach of Article 3 in medical cases: The ‘applicability’ of Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB, (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/establishing-a-breach-of-article-3-in-medical-cases-the-applicability-of-
strasbourg-jurisprudence/ (reiterating the “deathbed test” from N. v. SSHD in claiming the “exceptional” 
Article 3 cases are only those where the individual is already terminally ill and still present in the territory 
of the expelling state). 
 6 See generally, B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165, (Sept. 7, 1998), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58224%22]}. 
 7 Savran v. Denmark, App. No. 57467/15, ¶¶ 35–54 (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-196152%22]}; Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. 
No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 131–56; Aswat v. U.K., App. No. 17299/12, ¶¶ 50–62 (Apr. 16, 2013), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-118583%22]}; EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC); MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] 
EWCA (Civ) 1365 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 
(Eng.). 
 8 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.) (significantly limited the application of Article 
3 to cases involving an individual on their deathbed); EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t 
[2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC). 
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or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.9 In doing so, the court 
officially denounced the deathbed analysis and instead set forth a more 
comprehensive test for courts to apply moving forward. 
Ultimately, the Paposhvili decision promulgated a more favorable 
analysis for applicants of Article 3 health cases. Nevertheless, the United 
Kingdom national courts subsequently refused to recognize the new 
Paposhvili standard for Article 3 health cases and instead maintained the 
“clear and constant line of decisions by ECtHR” using the deathbed analysis, 
severely hindering the growth of Article 3 protections in such instances.10 
Since then, courts, scholars, and citizens subject to the ECHR have struggled 
to understand the interpretation and application of Article 3 to health cases.11 
In sum, the severely limited and inconsistent approaches taken in such 
instances leaves a protection gap in Article 3 health cases. Therefore, this 
essay will examine the need for the ECtHR to resolve the complexity of 
applying Article 3 protections to cases of deteriorated health and deportation. 
Specifically, this article will (i) explore the development of Article 3 case 
law and (ii) further analyze the Article 3 health case law, (iii) identify ECHR 
Articles 2 and 8 as other potential legal implications for such health cases, 
and (iv) compare ECHR Article 3 to Article 5 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (“ACHR”). In doing so, this essay will generally argue 
that the ECtHR and national courts should recognize the Paposhvili case as 
a step toward broadening the application of Article 3 to cases of deportation 
in poor health. With that said, the ECtHR needs to set forth a more definitive 
test for national courts to apply. Thus, this essay will also attempt to 
introduce concepts that the ECtHR should consider in developing a new 
standard in order to provide a firmer Article 3 protection beyond the 
deathbed scenario. 
 
 9 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 180–84; see also Chloe Spaven, Article 3 Health 
Cases – A new approach, WILSON SOLICITORS LLP (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wilsonllp.co.uk/article-
3-health-cases-new-approach/. 
 10 EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC) (limiting the 
application of Paposhvili in national courts since a current and conflicting standard already exists in UK 
domestic law (i.e. N. v. U.K.)). 
 11 See, e.g., Chai Patel, Split human rights court suggests lower threshold for resisting removal on 
medical grounds, FREE MOVEMENT, (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.freemovement.org.uk/split-human-
rights-court-suggests-lower-threshold-for-resisting-removal-on-medical-grounds/; Alice Muzira, Article 
3 Medical Condition Cases: The Paposhvili Test Returns to Plague the Court of Appeal, UK 
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE WATCH BLOG (June 19, 2018), 
https://ukimmigrationjusticewatch.com/2018/06/19/article-3-medical-condition-cases-the-paposhvili-
test-returns-to-plague-the-court-of-appeal/ (claiming that national courts are currently stuck between two 
applicable tests in medical condition cases). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This article will first explore the history and development of (i) Article 
3 itself; (ii) Article 3 health law; (iii) other legal implications in Article 3 
health cases, including ECHR Articles 2 and 8; and (iv) Article 5 of the 
ACHR. Cultivating a better understanding of these individual topics 
provides firmer standing for why these deportation cases belong under the 
purview of ECHR Article 3 protections. The succeeding information will 
then be used to advance the argument for why and how the current Article 3 
health standard should be loosened. 
A. The Development of ECHR Article 3 
In practice, Article 3 of the ECHR affords two separate components to 
its enforcement – (i) torture and (ii) inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment.12 That said, the ECtHR requires the allegedly wrongful 
treatment to meet an entry-level threshold based on the severity of the 
suffering incurred.13 The measurement of this minimum depends on certain 
circumstances of the case (e.g., duration of the treatment, physical or mental 
effects, sex, age, and state of health of the victim).14 Once the entry level 
threshold is met, though, the ECtHR has traditionally distinguished between 
inhuman and degrading treatment and the much worse torture claims by 
establishing another separate severity threshold.15 Essentially, torture 
developed a much higher threshold, separate from the “minimum level of 
severity” threshold to receive Article 3 standing, due to its “special stigma.”16 
Everything not found to be torture is thus encompassed in inhuman and 
degrading treatment.17 
The distinction between these three acts has developed through ECtHR 
case law over time, with torture always somehow alluding to an aggravated 
form of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.18 At first, torture 
 
 12 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 3; ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1–5; ASS’N FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF TORTURE, Guide to Jurisprudence on Torture and Ill Treatment, 13 (June 2002), 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/16023/Guide%20to%20Jurisprudence%20on%20Torture_E.pdf 
[hereinafter APT Guide]. 
 13 Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 162 (references this minimum level of severity); 
see also ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 3 (“[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity to fall within the scope of Article 3.”). 
 14 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 13 (noting this as being an “entry level threshold”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 14 (“torture was often an ‘aggravated form of inhuman treatment’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 17 Id. at 13. 
 18 Greek Case, Judgement of 18 November 1969, No. 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (1969) (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R.) (reading a purposive element into torture); see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 
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was distinguished from the other two acts through a finding of purpose in the 
act committed.19 However, Ireland v. U.K. adjusted this analysis ten years 
later to instead base it upon a level of severity threshold. Not only did the 
ECtHR in Ireland initially allude to the two individualized concepts of 
Article 3 – “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” – 
but it also acknowledged the torture threshold to be “serious and cruel 
suffering.”20 This case thus shifted the focus of the distinction between the 
three elements of Article 3 from a finding of purpose in conducting the act 
to the severity of its suffrage. This was also the first instance of tiering the 
three acts based upon the progression of severity. 21 Eventually, the purpose 
element was reintroduced in Selmouni v. France and remains implicitly 
acknowledged in the ECtHR analysis today.22 Also, The Greek Case and 
Ireland remain the two prominent cases in defining the three acts which 
make up Article 3, with both indicating that the two most relevant features 
of distinction are purpose for the act and severity of the suffering. 
In 1989, exactly twenty years after the Greek Case, Soering v. United 
Kingdom explored a different aspect of Article 3 analysis in evaluating 
whether potential harm can constitute a breach of Article 3 in extradition and 
expulsion cases.23 Here, extradition would not be allowed where “substantial 
grounds” were shown that the person would face “a real risk” of being 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in the receiving 
 
24351/94; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 13–14 (noting that the purposive element read into torture was 
later refined in favor of a “threshold based on a sliding scale of severity between the three acts.”). 
 19 The Greek Case involved a review from the ECtHR on treatment from Greek security forces 
following a military coup in 1967. Specifically, the Article 3 allegations included an administrative 
practice of the government which led to a destruction of political participation and a breach in Article 3. 
Id. 
 20 Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (the court recognized that the two threshold 
determinations involved a similar subjective measuring of severity of pain and suffering occasioned by 
the act.). The Ireland case concerned five methods of interrogation used by the UK troops on suspected 
IRA members and found that the five techniques of sleep deprivation, stress positions, deprivation of food 
and drink, subjection to noise and hooding to be in violation of Article 3, as inhuman treatment. Id. 
(finding the five techniques did not rise to the high threshold necessary to constitute torture since there 
was no physical bodily injury but there was at least intense physical and mental suffering and psychiatric 
disturbances during interrogations.); see Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, (July 28, 1999), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58287%22]}; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 
14. 
 21 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 14–15. 
 22 Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94 at ¶ 315; 
APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16. 
 23 Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 23. This case concerned a German national 
residing in the United Kingdom on a charge of murder in the United States and found that UK would be 
in violation of Article 3 if it were to extradite the applicant due to the “real risk of being subject to inhuman 
or degrading treatment” on death row upon extradition. Id. 
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country.24 However, the case clarified that a mere possibility of ill treatment 
in the receiving country would not give rise to a violation of Article 3.25 
While the ECtHR is allowed to subjectively determine cases of potential 
harm or risk, Saadi v. Italy concluded that the Court cannot undergo a 
balancing test to extradite a person based on the level of harm he or she poses 
to society.26 
Overall, the general understanding coming out of these significant 
Article 3 cases is that the ECtHR maintains its “degree of flexibility” by 
purposefully refraining from the creation of an official list of acts which 
classify as either torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.27 In doing so, the 
Court regards the ECHR as “a living instrument which must be interpreted 
in light of present-day conditions” and affords itself great flexibility when 
applying it to Article 3 cases.28 These changes in perspective can be essential 
in recognizing the extension of a right, as is seen in Article 3 health cases 
where a real risk of substantial harm is presented by deportation. 
B. The Absolute Nature of Article 3 
Though the ECHR does not expressly maintain that the protections of 
Article 3 are absolute, they are generally understood to be absolute rights in 
nature,29 emerging from “human rights discourse” and ECtHR 
 
 24 Id. at ¶ 29; Cruz Varas & Others v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, (Mar. 20, 1991), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57674%22]} (involving the potential expulsion 
of two political asylum applicants and finding no violation merely because they did not establish strong 
enough reasoning, or ‘substantial grounds’, to obtain refugee status). The Soering decision has also been 
expanded to apply when the expulsion of a person has already occurred, indicating that the “level of risk” 
be determined from the knowledge accrued at the time of the decision to deport. See Vilvarajah and Others 
v. U.K., App. No. 13448/87, (Oct. 30, 1991), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2213448/87%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
57713%22]} (reaffirming Cruz Varas and setting specific criteria for assessing the risk of ill-treatment); 
Chahal v. U.K., App. No. 22414/93, (Nov. 15, 1996), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58004%22]}; Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 
37201/06, ¶¶ 124–27, (Feb. 28, 2008), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
85276%22]}. 
 25 Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 37; Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 13448/87 at ¶¶ 109–113. 
 26 Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27. 
 27 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 15. 
 28 Id. at 13; see, e.g., Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶ 101 (noting “the increasingly high 
standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values 
of democratic societies”). 
 29 Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27; Michael K. Addo & Nicholas Grief, Does Article 
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?, EUR. J. INT’L L., 510, 510–
524 (1998). 
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jurisprudence.30 An absolute right is defined as being absent “permissible 
limitations, exceptions or derogations,” and holds applicable regardless of 
who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what 
she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.31 Articles 
32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees 
present similar protections; however, the ECtHR itself has argued that ECHR 
Article 3 Protections are “wider” than those set forth in said Convention.32 
According to the UN Refugee Agency, this interpretation of Article 3 serves 
as a “useful safety net” in international deportation law and reminds the 
Court of its incredibly important role.33 For instance, in Vilvarajah v. United 
Kingdom, the Court recognized that its examination into breaches of Article 
3 “must necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of 
this provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of 
the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.”34 This absolute 
nature of the protections afforded by Article 3 can also play a significant role 
in cases where the court appears to be taking inappropriate factors into 
consideration of whether or not a breach of Article 3 is found. This 
recognition might be essential in the analysis of Article 3 health cases. 
C. Article 3 Health Law 
The general Article 3 information outlined above may prove helpful on 
its own for finding a clear Article 3 protection in cases of health and 
deportation. This subsection, however, takes a more in-depth view of the 
most relevant Article 3 health cases and the key concerns implicated by them 
in order to help facilitate a better understanding of the essential elements and 
issues of this jurisprudence. It is easiest to understand the Article 3 health 
case law as creating three separate periods: (1) D. v. United Kingdom and the 
“very exceptional circumstances” assessment,35 (2) N. v. United Kingdom 
 
 30 Id. at 512–13; see also Ireland v. U.K., App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 163 (ECtHR formaly declaring “the 
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 31 Addo & Grief, supra note 29, at 513; see also ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15(2); ECHR Article 3 
Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 4–8. 
 32 See Chahal v. U.K., App. No. 22414/93 at ¶¶ 79–83; see also Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, Article 3: Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights-act/article-3-freedom-torture-and-inhuman-or-
degrading-treatment (noting that the absolute nature of Article 3 “means it must never be limited or 
restricted in any way”). 
 33 ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 7. 
 34 Vilvarajah & Others v. U.K., App. No. 13448/87 at ¶¶ 105–08. 
 35 D. v. U.K. was decided in 1997 and this period lasted until N. v. U.K. was decided in 2008. 
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and the “deathbed” analysis,36 and (3) Paposhvili v. Belgium and the formal 
expansion of Article 3.37 This section thus analyzes these three periods 
accordingly. 
1. D. v. United Kingdom and the “very exceptional circumstances” 
assessment 
As briefly discussed earlier, D. v. United Kingdom was the first decision 
to apply Article 3 protections to cases of deportation involving sickly 
individuals who would receive inadequate health care upon arrival to the 
receiving State. The applicant in this case suffered from HIV/AIDS when he 
was threatened with expulsion from the United Kingdom to St. Kitts due to 
his criminal convictions.38 The ECtHR found the removal would expose him 
to the risk of dying under the “most distressing circumstances,” which 
amounted to inhuman treatment under Article 3.39 The significance of this 
case lies in the Courts’ pronouncement that this ruling was due to the “very 
exceptional circumstances of [the] case and given the compelling 
humanitarian considerations at stake.”40 This groundbreaking case set the 
path for an abundance of similar Article 3 health cases, where the ECtHR 
attempted to make sense of the “very exceptional circumstance” standard.41 
Post-D. v. U.K. case law was quick to limit situations that were very 
exceptional, though, as only one other case led to a violation of Article 3 in 
the designated period.42 
The one other case, B.B. v. France (1998), involved an applicant who 
was suffering from the AIDS virus compounded by Kaposi’s syndrome and 
 
 36 N. v. U.K. was decided in 2008 and this period technically lasted until 2016, when Paposhvili was 
decided. However, national courts have refused to recognize Paposhvili, so it could be argued that N. v. 
U.K. still rules. 
 37 Paposhvili was decided in 2016 and should arguably still be in effect today. 
 38 D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 (finding three factors—(i) critical illness and being close to death, 
(ii) no guaranteed access to medical care in the receiving State, and (iii) lack of availability of family care 
or social support in the receiving State—as the “very exceptional circumstances” needed to meet the 
Article 3 threshold). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 15. 
 41 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05; Ndangoya v. Sweden, App. No. 17868/03, 12–13, (June 22, 2004), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-24018%22]}; Amegnigan v. Netherlands, App. 
No. 25629/04, 8–10, (Nov. 25, 2004), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
67675%22]}; Arcila Henao v. Netherlands, App. No. 13669/03, 7–9, (June 24, 2003), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-23281%22]}; Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 
44599/98, ¶¶ 303, 319, (Feb. 6, 2001), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
59206%22]}; S.C.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 46553/99, 6–8, (Feb. 15, 2000), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-5079%22]}; Karara v. Finland, App. No. 
40900/98, (May 29, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-4301%22]}; B.B. v. 
France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165 at ¶¶ 37–39. 
 42 Id. 
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presented signs of acute immunosuppression. The significance of this case, 
according to subsequent courts, was that the applicant had reached an 
“advanced stage” of his illness.43 The ECtHR found that the applicant’s 
return to his native country of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it 
was likely he would lack access to treatment specifically designed to inhibit 
the spread of the virus, would considerably increase the risk of infection.44 
The Court, in ruling that his deportation would violate Article 3, therefore 
found that the exposure of this applicant to a substantial risk to his health 
was so serious as to amount to a violation of Article 3.45 Following this, 
though, Article 3 health cases were all rejected, even under seemingly similar 
circumstances. 
2. N. v. United Kingdom and the “deathbed” analysis 
D. v. U.K. was severely limited by the time N. v. United Kingdom 
(hereinafter N. v. U.K.) came along, which only further narrowed its 
interpretation. N. v. U.K. developed from the United Kingdom Upper 
Tribunal’s ruling in N. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(“SSHD”), which clarified that “very exceptional circumstances,” meant the 
applicant was in the “last stage of his terminal illness”.46 Therefore, the “very 
exceptional circumstances” standard should only apply in such cases of 
either terminal illness or the advanced stage of an illness. The applicant in 
this case also suffered from chronic AIDS with “considerable 
immunosuppression and . . . disseminated mycobacterium TB” but she was 
not considered critically ill and thus no violation of Article could be found 
upon her deportation to Uganda.47 On appeal, the ECtHR Grand Chamber in 
N. v. U.K. affirmed the Upper Tribunal’s decision that this particular case 
did not constitute a breach of Article 3.48 While the ECtHR alluded to the 
possibility that there could be “very exceptional circumstances” other than 
deathbed cases,49 it did not set forth a definitive standard for subsequent 
 
 43 B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165 at ¶¶ 19–23. 
 44 Id. at 12. 
 45 Id. 
 46 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 [16], (Eng.) (“The fact that an 
applicant’s life expectancy will be reduced, even substantially reduced, because the facilities in the 
receiving country do not match those in the expelling country is not sufficient to engage Article 3. 
Something more is required. I have already referred to the special circumstances which enabled the court 
in D to find that Article 3 was engaged. I do not say that Article 3 will only ever be engaged where the 
applicant is in the last stages of a terminal illness. But I consider that the class of case recognised in D. as 
engaging Article 3.”). 
 47 Id. at 3. 
 48 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05. 
 49 Id. . Specifically, where the “humanitarian considerations are equally compelling.”; Id. 
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courts to apply and instead recommended each case be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 
Thus, the affirmation of the N. v. SSHD decision instead allowed for 
national courts to officially restrict Article 3 health cases to the deathbed 
analysis.50 This situation was later found in GS (India) v. SSHD.51 Therefore, 
the issues of the N. v. U.K. period more so involve the misapplication by 
ECHR signatory states of ECtHR standards to cases following the 2008 
decision rather than the error in judgment on behalf of the ECtHR. That is 
not to say that the ECtHR did nothing wrong, though. It should have found 
a violation of Article 3 in N. v. U.K. based on “compelling humanitarian 
considerations” or, at the very least, provided distinct factors of “very 
exceptional circumstances” for future courts to apply rather than the vague 
statement that it did.52 In fact, the dissent in N. v. U.K. expresses a reasoned 
analysis more aligned with Paposhvili in recognizing that the Court is on the 
wrong side of the argument.53 
3. Paposhvili v. Belgium and the Formal Expansion of Article 3 
On its face, Paposhvili v. Belgium might not appear to affect much 
change from the principles referenced in N. v. U.K. However, the standard it 
produced can be thought to “clarify or qualify” the N. v. U.K. standard to 
some degree, and relax the language for which circumstances are “very 
compelling”.54 Paposhvili involved an applicant suffering from chronic 
lymphocytic leukemia and tuberculosis. The ECtHR found it would be a 
violation of Article 3 to deport Paposhvili to Georgia, declaring his condition 
as life-threatening, based on considerably detailed evidence provided by 
Paposhvili of his specialized treatment.55 Coming out of this case, the Court 
 
 50 See generally, Aswat v. U.K., App. No. 17299/12 at ¶¶ 50–52; GS (India) & Ors v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 [66] (Eng.); Tatar v. Switzerland, App. No. 65692/12, ¶ 50 
(July 14, 2015), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-153770%22]}. 
 51 GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.) (This case involved 
six applicants, five of which were suffering from terminal renal failure or end stage kidney disease 
(ESKD) and the sixth was at an advanced stage of HIV infection. The court here decided that these 
applicants could not fall within the D exception because their conditions could not be “alleviated by 
recourse to Article 3”, no matter how grave they may be.); Id. (After further analysis of the application 
of D. v. U.K., the court here found “[the D. v. U.K.] citations demonstrate that in the view of the House 
of Lords the D exception is confined to deathbed cases.”). 
 52 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 (applying Article 3 to cases where the individual is “critically ill” 
and “close to death,” thereby indirectly affirming the deathbed application). 
 53 Id. at 251–62 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
 54 AM (Zimbabwe) & Anor v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 64, [30] 
(Eng.); Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 194 (changing, for instance, N. v. U.K.’s “critically 
ill” and “close to death” Article 3 qualifications to “very serious”, “chronic illness” that is “life-
threatening.”). 
 55 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 206 . 
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provided guidance on the burden of proof necessary for the expelling State 
to comply with Article 3, focusing on the foreseeable consequences of 
removal.56 Specifically, the court listed three verifications for the returning 
State to make prior to a person’s deportation: (i) to verify whether the 
available care is sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the 
applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to treatment 
contrary to Article 3; (ii) to consider the extent to which the individual in 
question will actually have access to this care and these facilities in the 
receiving State; and (iii) to consider the cost of medication and treatment, 
the existence of a social and family network, and the distance to be travelled 
in order to have access to the required care.57 The Court also added that if 
there remain “serious doubts” regarding the impact of removal following the 
States’ assessment, then the returning State “must obtain individual and 
sufficient assurance from the receiving State that appropriate treatment will 
be available and accessible on return.”58 Ultimately, the ECtHR shifted a 
significant amount of the pleading burden onto the expelling state and 
presented a more lenient standard for the protection of sick individuals facing 
deportation. Nevertheless, national courts have either refused to apply the 
Paposhvili standard or have arguably applied it incorrectly.59 
For instance, EA &. Ors specifically rejected Paposhvili in favor of the 
clear and constant N. v. U.K. standard applied in the United Kingdom.60 
Tensions between these standards increased even more in the United 
Kingdom when the national court was presented with cases like AM 
(Zimbabwe) v. SSHD and MM (Malawi) v. SSHD. In particular, AM 
(Zimbabwe) confirmed that Paposhvili “relax[ed] the test for violation of 
Article 3 in the case of removal of a foreign national with a medical 
condition,” moving past the previously accepted deathbed analysis.61 But, it 
 
 56 Id. at ¶¶ 170, 187. 
 57 Id. at ¶¶ 189-91. 
 58 Id. at ¶ 191. 
 59 Savran v. Denmark, App. No. 57467/15; Aswat v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12; EA & 
Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC); MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1365 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t 
[2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.); N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 (Eng.). 
 60 EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC).This case concerned 
three applicants suffering from schizoaffective disorder, HIV/AIDS, and ankylosing spondylitis. All were 
receiving treatment in the United Kingdom but were not yet at a critical stage in their illness. The Upper 
Tribunal found that it was not bound to follow the Paposhvili test because it departed from a “clear and 
constant line of authority” including N. v U.K. and was not consistent with domestic law of the United 
Kingdom. Instead of applying this “contrary . . . judicial precedent”, the court followed N. v. U.K. and 
GS (India), which applied N. v. U.K., in finding the D. v. U.K. exception “confined to deathbed cases.” 
Id. at [29]. 
 61 AM (Zimbabwe) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 64, [37] (Eng.). 
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“did so only to a very modest extent.”62 MM (Malawi), however, complicated 
the situation by presenting a convoluted approach to Article 3 health cases 
in holding that an applicant might meet the Paposhvili test even if they do 
not meet the N. v. U.K. standard.63 It further confused the situation by 
applying the binding N. v. U.K. criteria but also appearing to equate the actual 
test used with that of the Paposhvili factors.64 Ironically, the ECtHR during 
this time made clear that Paposhvili was the “formally binding guidance on 
the removal of seriously ill people” and that it should be applied when 
considering removal.65 
Very recently, the ECtHR split in its decision to validate Paposhvili in 
Savran v. Denmark, which dealt with the aspect of “sufficient assurance” 
from the Paposhvili test.66 In officially affirming the Paposhvili test over N. 
v. U.K., the ECtHR found that the expelling State had not adequately 
mitigated the uncertainties raising serious doubts as to the impact of 
removing the applicant.67 Even given the direct language of this analysis, 
critics today argue that this case was not the correct one to affirm Paposhvili 
and the ECtHR rushed into this decision in an attempt to tie the hands of 
ECtHR signatory states regarding Article 3 health cases.68 However, the true 
effect of this case is yet to be determined, as it was only decided in January 
2019. Until then, these cases ultimately represent a potential failure of the 
ECtHR and national courts to protect sickly individuals from inhumane and 
degrading treatment following their deportation. Two major issues cause 
this: (1) ECtHR has not provided an effective standard for the national courts 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1365, [¶ 10] (Eng.) 
(involving applicants who were suffering from HIV infection and primary mediastinal large-B cell 
lymphoma. Despite there being no violation of Article 3 found, the Court did recognize that applicants 
can meet either N. v. U.K. or Paposhvili); see also Muzira, supra note 11. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Khaksar v. U.K., App. No. 2654/18, ¶ 32 (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-182755%22]}. The applicant in this case was 
a victim of bombing in Afghanistan and suffered from medical conditions following the blasts. He was 
threatened with deportation back to Afghanistan and was not considered to be in a critical stage of an 
illness. While the court could not apply the Paposhvili standard because the applicant had not exhausted 
all national remedies available to him, the Court did affirm the standing of Paposhvili in such 
circumstances. Id. 
 66 Savran v. Denmark, App. No. 57467/15 at ¶ 22. This case concerned a paranoid schizophrenic 
applicant whom was being deported to Turkey on account of his criminal convictions. The court 
recognized the burden shift from Paposhvili in finding that the expelling State needed to mitigate any 
doubts of treatment contrary to Article 3 upon deportation. Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Mark Klaassen, A new chapter on the deportation of ill persons and Article 3 ECHR: the European 
Court of Human Rights judgment in Savran v. Denmark, STRAUSBOURG OBSERVERS (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/10/17/a-new-chapter-on-the-deportation-of-ill-persons-and-
article-3-echr-the-european-court-of-human-rights-judgment-in-savran-v-denmark/. 
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to follow in applying Article 3 as Papshvili did and (2) the national courts 
are improperly applying the principles and standards which are provided by 
the ECtHR. Given this, it follows that the ECtHR and national courts need 
to resolve the complexity involved in applying Article 3 to deportation cases 
of individuals in poor health. 
D. Other Legal Implications: ECHR Articles 2 and 8 
Aside from the implication of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, these Article 3 health cases present corresponding issues for an 
individual’s rights to life, privacy, and family life. In fact, “[h]ealth-related 
cases brought before the [ECtHR] have most frequently been argued under 
Articles 2, 3, [and] 8 . . . of the Convention.”69 Still, the ECtHR regularly 
dismisses any adjoining Article 2 or 8 claims when they are advanced in such 
Article 3 health cases.70 Therefore, this section will explore Articles 2 (right 
to life) and 8 (right to privacy and family life) of the ECHR and their 
corresponding case law in order to develop the argument that these articles 
can greatly enhance the finding of an ECHR violation, especially when 
Article 3 alone proves insufficient . In general, this section will help develop 
the idea that the ECtHR should review all claims pleaded in such Article 3 
health cases to provide the full protections postulated by the Convention. 
This is especially relevant when Article 3 fails.71 
1. Article 2 and the Right to Life 
Article 2 of the ECHR protects “[e]veryone’s right to life” and specifies 
that “[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention 
of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary.”72 Similar to Article 3, Article 2 is said to 
fundamentally tie to the absolute protections provided by Article 15 of the 
ECHR, meaningthere must be no derogation from its protections.73 In 
practice, the Court has interpreted Article 2 to include two substantive 
obligations of the State: (1) the general obligation to protect the right to life 
 
 69 Thematic Report, Health-related issues in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
1, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) [hereinafter Thematic Report]. 
 70 See, e.g., N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 16. 
 71 See Id. at 20–31 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
 72 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 2; ECtHR, Guide on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (updated 2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_2_ENG.pdf [hereinafter 
ECtHR Article 2 Guide] at 6 (listing “(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order 
to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; [and] (c) in action lawfully 
taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection” as examples of absolutely necessary situations). 
 73 ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69. 
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and (2) the prohibition of intentional deprivation of life.74 The effect of this 
was the complete abolition of death penalty sentences in Protocol 13 to the 
Convention.75 
As expected, there are many Article 2 cases which help to inform issues 
presented in Article 3 health cases. For instance, McCann and Others v. 
United Kingdom provides that “the object and purpose of the Convention as 
an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its 
provisions must be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective.”76 It also creates an “absolutely necessary” threshold 
for Article 2 cases involving intentional acts to require proof that a violation 
has occurred beyond that which was absolutely necessary.77 Taken together 
with the ECtHR ruling in Oyal v. Turkey, where the court found allegations 
of persons suffering from serious illnesses to fall under Article 2 of the 
Convention when the circumstances potentially engaged the responsibility 
of the State, ECtHR case law indicates that both intentional acts or decisions 
of the State in question as well as omission of necessary acts of the State 
implicate Article 2, as related to health cases.78 Finally, the ECtHR in R.R. 
and Others v. Hungary examined allegations of Article 2 violations 
 
 74 Id.; see also Boso v. Italy (Reports of Judgements and Decisions), App. No. 50490/99, ¶¶ 458–60 
(May 9, 2002), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-23338%22]} (providing a list of 
exceptions). 
 75 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15; Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstance, 
opened for signature Mar. 5, 2002, ETS No. 187 (2002) [hereinafter Protocol 13]; ECtHR, Guide on 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, (2020), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_15_ENG.pdf [hereinafter ECtHR Article 15 Guide]. 
 76 McCann & Others v. U.K., App. No.18984/91, ¶ 146 (Sept. 27, 1995), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57943%22]} (emphasis added); see also 
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 27. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Oyal v. Turkey, App. No.4864/05 at ¶ 76, (June 6, 2010), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-97848%22]} (unanimously finding a violation 
of Article 2 due to the States’ failure to train, supervise and inspect the work of the medical staff involved 
in blood transfusions, which led to his HIV infection, and emphasizing the need to do so for “more general 
considerations” of public health and safety and the prevention of similar errors.); see also L.C.B. v. U.K., 
App. No. 23413/94, (Nov. 26, 1996), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
45780%22]} (concerning an applicant suffering from leukaemia); G.N. & Others v. Italy, App. No. 
43134/05, (Jan. 03, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-95926%22]} 
(concerning applicants suffering from a potentially life-threatening disease of hepatitis); Hristozov & 
Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 47039/11, (Apr. 29, 2013), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-114492%22]} (concerning applicants suffering 
from different forms of terminal cancer). 
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involving potential risks to an individual’s life that had not yet materialized 
and found that there had been a serious threat to their lives.79 
Following this, it is understandable why Article 3 health cases regularly 
include Article 2 violation claims.80 However, the Court often opts to dismiss 
the Article 2 analysis once they have made a ruling on the Article 3 
violation.81 In doing so, the ECtHR reasons that the substance of Article 2 
and Article 3 complaints are “indissociable . . . in respect of the 
consequences of the impugned decision for [the applicant’s] life, health and 
welfare.”82 Interestingly enough, the ECtHR’s own guidelines include a 
procedural obligation “to carry out an effective investigation into alleged 
breaches of its substantive limb” due to its fundamental character.83 
However, the case law is lacking on such investigation in Article 3 health 
cases. 
2. Article 8 and the Right to Privacy and Family Life 
Article 8 of the ECtHR proclaims, “everyone has the right to his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence” and “[t]here shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right . . . .”84 
Section 1 of Article 8 signifies four individual categories for invoking the 
article in a complaint – private life, family life, home, and correspondence.85 
Much like Article 3, the ECtHR has broadly defined the scope of Article 8, 
 
 79 R.R. & Others v. Hungary, App. No. 36037/17, (Mar. 2, 2021), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-208406%22]} (involving applicants who were 
denied access to the Witness Protection Program). 
 80 D. v U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶¶ 55–59 (claim was brought but the Court determined it 
unnecessary to go through the analysis); ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at 18 (“Article 2 of the 
[ECHR] prohibits the extradition or deportation of an individual to another State where substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the 
death penalty there.”). ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at 19 (While Article 2 prohibits deportation 
in the face of a real risk to the individual’s life, it focuses on the applicant facing some form of death 
penalty or social crucifixion upon his return rather than physical or mental health). 
 81 D. v U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 58 (“Commission did not find it necessary to decide whether 
the risk to the applicant’s life expectancy created by his removal disclosed a breach of Article 2 (art. 2). 
It considered that it would be more appropriate to deal globally with this allegation when examining his 
related complaints under Article 3”). 
 82 Id. 




 84 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 8 (also providing exceptions to section 2: “except such as in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in domestic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
 85 ECtHR Guide, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [hereinafter ECtHR Article 8 Guide] at ¶ 1 . 
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rather than subjecting it to an exhaustive definition or list of acts.86 However, 
the scope has been limited by a severity test in some circumstances.87 “Acts 
or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical or 
psychological integrity of another,” 88 have been included in such 
circumstances because the ECtHR articulates Article 8 to particularly 
guarantee “a person’s right to physical and psychological integrity.”89 
Additionally, Article 8 provides a right to personal development, and the 
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world.90 While not all relationships “fall within the scope of private 
life,”91 parental and marital statuses have been recognized as falling within 
the ambit of private and family life.92 Finally, unlike the absolute rights found 
in Articles 2 and 3, the analysis of Article 8 involves a weighing of 
competing interests to find a “fair balance” between the protections of an 
individual and society.93 
X and Y v. Netherlands was the first indication by the ECtHR that 
Article 8 covered the physical and moral integrity of a person.94 Moreover, 
 
 86 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶¶ 46–47; see also ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, 
at ¶¶ 2-3. 
 87 Nicolae Virgiliu Tânase v. Romania, App. No. 41720/13, ¶ 128 (June 25, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194307 ; see also Denisov v. Ukraine, App. No. 76639/11, ¶ 116 
(Sept. 25, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-191971 (“If the consequence-based approach was 
at stake, the threshold of severity with respect to those typical aspects of private life assumed crucial 
importance. It was for the applicant to show convincingly that the threshold had been attained. The 
applicant had to present evidence substantiating consequences of the impugned measure. The Court 
would only accept that Article 8 was applicable where those consequences were very serious and had 
affected his or her private life to a very significant degree. An applicant’s suffering was to be assessed by 
comparing his or her life before and after the measure in question. In determining the seriousness of the 
consequences in employment-related cases it was appropriate to assess the subjective perceptions claimed 
by the applicant against the background of the objective circumstances existing in the particular case. 
That analysis would have to cover both the material and the non-material impact of the alleged measure. 
However, it remained for the applicant to define and substantiate the nature and extent of his or her 
suffering, which had to have had a causal connection with the impugned measure.”). 
 88 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 67; Nicolae Virgiliu Tânase v. Romania, App. No. 
41720/13 at ¶ 126 (“The concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.). 
 89 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 26 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
 90 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶68; See generally Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02, ¶ 
61 (April 29, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60448. 
 91 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 69. 
 92 Id. at ¶ 274. 
 93 Id. at ¶ 140. 
 94 X. and Y. v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, ¶ 22 (Mar. 26, 1985), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603 (This case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled 
sixteen-year old girl and the absence of legal protection available to her. Following this, the Court has 
held that “the authorities’ positive obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention 
and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 (ibid.) – may include 
a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of 
violence by private individuals,”); ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 79. 
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Article 8 has been invoked in “very exceptional circumstances,” specifically 
when the expelling State either knowingly acted or failed to act on behalf of 
a person whose life was threatened due to their lack of access to necessary, 
life-saving treatment.95 It reasonably follows that Article 3 health cases also 
frequently involve claims of Article 8 violations, as they often involve a 
review of the applicant’s ties and support system. However, prior to N. v. 
U.K., the practice of the ECtHR was to recurrently halt analysis on the 
Article 8 claim after it either accepted or rejected the Article 3 claim, similar 
to their Article 2 procedure.96 The dissent in N. v. U.K. challenged this 
procedure based on the understanding of Article 8 outlined directly above, 
stating that when the Court faces “the situation of a person who will, without 
doubt, be sent to certain death . . . it could neither legally nor morally confine 
itself to [conclude] ‘[no] separate question arises under Article 8 of the 
Convention’.”97 The one prominent ECtHR case prior to N. v. U.K., which at 
least reviewed the Article 8 claim, even after dismissing the Article 3 claim, 
is Bensaid v. United Kingdom.98 This case involved an applicant suffering 
from a long-term mental illness – schizophrenia – in which the Court found 
the “real risk” of the removal insufficient to meet Article 3 standards.99 
Rather than stop the inquiry there, however, the Court rightfully assessed the 
Article 8 claim separately, clarifying that “[m]ental health must also be 
regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral 
integrity.”100 Nevertheless, the Court found no violation of Article 8, as 
removal of the applicant would comply with the “accordance of the law” 
 
 95 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 117; see also Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 
App. No. 54969/09, ¶ 84 (June 25, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194325 (the court further 
found “where a patient did not have access to such treatment because of “systemic or structural 
dysfunction in hospital services, and where the authorities knew or ought to have known of this risk and 
did not take the necessary measures to prevent it from being realized.”) (citing Lopes de Sousa Fernandes 
v. Portugal). 
 96 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶¶ 26, 30 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). The later Court called this 
practice into question. (“Whilst it is understandable that the Court . . . has refrained from examining a 
second complaint – concerning the same facts – when the first has given rise to a finding of a violation, 
it is certainly strange for the Court to . . . [do so] after finding there was no violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention”, merely proclaiming that “it is not necessary.”). 
 97 Id. at ¶ 26 (internal citations omitted). 
 98 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶¶ 46–49. 
 99 Id. at ¶ 40 (noting the “high threshold set by Article 3” and explaining that the applicant’s situation 
would merely be “less favourable” in Algeria and there is still risk for relapse or deterioration in the 
United Kingdom). 
 100 Id. at ¶ 46 (specifying that “the Court’s case-law does not exclude that treatment which does not 
reach the severity of Article 3 treatment may nonetheless breach Article 8 in its private life aspect where 
there are sufficiently adverse effects on physical and moral integrity.”). Other important elements of the 
personal sphere protected by Article 8 include gender identification, name and sexual orientation and 
sexual life. See ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 148-149. 
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feature of Article 8, Section 2.101 Regardless of the outcome in this case, it 
can be said that Article 8 plays a prominent role in at least the Article 3 heath 
cases involving mental illness. 
E. Comparative Analysis: Article 5 and the ACHR 
Much can be inferred from the differences between the two torture 
provisions of the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“ACHR”). On the face of the two instruments, the ACHR appears to provide 
greater rights and protections than the ECHR.102 However, as we have seen 
through the ECtHR’s interpretation of a purposive element in the Article 3 
analysis of torture, the ECtHR has begun converging with the American 
provisions and standards through practice.103 This suggests that a 
comparative analysis of the ACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (“IACtHR”) jurisprudence can provide valuable information and 
spark guidelines for how the European judicial system can clean up the 
messy Article 3 health case law. 
The initial distinction between these two documents lies in the torture 
provision titles themselves. With the ECHR Article 3 provision entitled 
“Prohibition of Torture” and the ACHR Article 5 provision designated 
“Right to Humane Treatment,” these articles seem to present both negative 
and positive rights on their collective states, respectively. To explain, Article 
3 of the ECHR focuses on things its member states cannot do, while Article 
5 of the ACHR highlights the rights available to member states in its title. 
This distinction can play a significant role in arguing that the American 
system has a more lenient Article 5 protection; however, this cannot be 
determined without first looking to the actual text of the provisions. 
 
 101 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶ 48; see also ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at 
¶ 1 (explaining that section 2 of Article 8 provides that there shall be no interference by a public authority 
with one’s Article 8 rights and furthering that “[i]n order to invoke Article 8, an applicant must show his 
or her complaint falls within one of the four interests listed above. Upon such a showing, the Court then 
examines the extent of interference on the individual’s life. That said, there are exceptions which allow 
certain interferences by the State, which include national security, public safety, or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Ultimately, limitations are permitted so long as they 
are in “accordance with the law” and are “necessary in a democratic society” for the protection of one of 
the objectives set out above. The necessity then requires a balancing test between the conflicting 
interests.”). 
 102 For instance, the text of the ACHR’s Article 5 more expansively defines humane treatment and 
creates a positive right to it versus the negative right against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
presented in ECHR Article 3. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” art. 
5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at: https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf[hereinafter ACHR]. 
 103 See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶¶ 97–98; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 
24351/94 at ¶ 313; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16. 
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Vast differences separately exist in the actual language of these torture 
provisions. As previously articulated, Article 3 of the ECHR is short and 
simple: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”104 The ACHR, on the other hand, presents a much 
more in-depth vision for Article 5 protections, with 6 separate provisions 
referring to its guaranteed rights:  
 
“1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral 
integrity respected. 2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of 
their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person. 3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than 
the criminal. 4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, 
be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate 
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. 5. Minors 
while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and 
brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they 
may be treated in accordance with their status as minors. 6. Punishments 
consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform 
and social readaptation of the prisoners.”105  
 
Such an explicitly designed provision suggests that the founders of the 
ACHR and Article 5, in particular, desired a more protective right against 
acts of torture than the ECHR provided. In fact, it is clear that Article 5 goes 
far beyond protections against torture under the ECHR, as the language of 
Article 3 is merely one of the six provisions.106 
Similar to the ECtHR’s development of its Article 3 analysis, the 
IACtHR created (i) a threshold which must be passed before finding a 
violation of Article 5, (ii) distinctions between differing levels of violations, 
(iii) as well as many other issues relating to how far the Court is willing to 
go in interpreting the broadly written article. However, Caesar v. Trinidad 
and Tobago presents the comparative case from the IACtHR in Article 3 
violations.107 In this case, the applicant was sentenced to serve 20 years in a 
penitentiary with hard labor and to receive 15 strokes of the cat-o-nine tails. 
He had to be spread eagle for the flogging, and the punishment was carried 
out despite his [deteriorated] physical condition. Six people were present for 
the punishment. He screamed out in pain and eventually fainted. The 
 
 104 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 3. 
 105 ACHR, supra note 99, art. 5. 
 106 ACHR, supra note 99, art. 5(2). 
 107 Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.(Mar. 11, 2005) 
https://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_123_ing.pdf. 
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IACtHR consequently found corporal punishment in the form of flogging as 
a form of torture. 
Despite its scarcer jurisprudence, the IACtHR has indeed reviewed an 
Article 3 health case under the ACHR – Andrea Mortlock v. The United 
States. In this case, the applicant was a Jamaican national living in the United 
States where she contracted HIV/AIDS and required aggressive treatment 
and care.108 The applicant faced deportation due to her criminal convictions 
on drug offenses.109 Upon review, the IACtHR found that the applicant’s 
deportation would violate Article 5, as it would “amount to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment” when combined with the lack of psycho-social 
support for her care.110 What’s more, the deportation in this case would have 
been deemed punishment against the applicant since it was directly linked to 
her criminal convictions.111 The ACtHR’s finding that the applicant’s 
deportation “may well be fatal” despite the risk of death not being imminent 
affords protections to citizens of ACHR member states that have yet to firmly 
develop under the mirroring ECHR torture provision.112 This shows that the 
European justice system stands well below the American’s more lenient 
application of Article 5, at least in respect to the protections afforded to sick 
individuals facing deportation to countries with inadequate health care. In 
fact, the ECtHR referenced this itself, in S.J. v. Belgium, when the dissent 
celebrated the ACtHR’s finding in Andrea and embraced the rejection of N. 
v. U.K. for a more liberal standard.113 
II. ANALYSIS 
This section focuses on answering the broad question of whether the 
deportation of a person to a place where she or he will not receive adequate 
health care should constitute a violation of ECHR Article 3. In doing so, it 
addresses the two following sub-questions: First, is it an Article 3 violation 
to deport someone to a country with inadequate health care under the ECHR 
and at what point should the deportation constitute an Article 3 violation 
under the ECHR? Second, how can the ECtHR and national courts better 
review such cases in order to provide more meaningful protections to those 
 
 108 Andrea Mortlock v. The United States, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/08, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 16 (2009). 
 109 Id. at ¶ 20. 
 110 Id. at ¶ 90 (finding that her state of health was presently stable but that her deportation would 
nevertheless result in a premature death due to a “revival of the symptoms” given the lack of treatment 
available.). 
 111 Id. at ¶ 24. 
 112 Id. at ¶ 90. 
 113 S.J. v. Belgium, App. No. 70055/10, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
153361 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., dissenting). 
19:90 (2020) Northwestern Journal of Human Rights 
111 
inflicted? Both questions require an in-depth review of the background 
information provided above to determine which approach is the correct to 
take in Article 3 health cases. The second question requires identifying 
concepts that the ECtHR should consider in promulgating a more definitive 
standard for determining whether the deportation of a sick individual to a 
State with inadequate health care violates Article 3. For the purpose of 
clarity, this section will be organized similarly to the background sub-
sections above: (i) Article 3 today and its application in health cases; (ii) 
other legal implications in Article 3 health cases, including ECHR Articles 
2 and 8; and (iii) Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
A. Article 3 Today and its Application in Health Cases 
In considering the background information on Article 3 and its 
application in health cases from above, it follows that the ECtHR has been 
incorrectly applying Article 3 to deportation cases involving sick applicants 
and is still in a state of confusion e following Paposhvili’s more lenient 
application of a slightly relaxed standard. Additionally, the national courts 
are improperly refusing to apply Paposhvili over the long-established legal 
analysis from N. v. U.K. Given this, the ECtHR needs to go further than it 
did in Paposhvili in clarifying an appropriate and irrefutable standard to use 
in such Article 3 health cases. 
The ECtHR incorrectly applied Article 3 to these particular cases of 
deportation, as it demoted the absolute nature of the Article’s protections by 
approaching each of these cases in such a way that essentially no protection 
could be afforded. It is true that Article 3 is known to contain a high entry-
level threshold for the severity of suffering incurred; however, it is also true 
that this Court has afforded Article 3 protections in analogous situations 
outside of the health and deportation context. For instance, in Saadi and 
Soering, the challenged State did not directly inflict harm onto the applicants 
and the applicants regularly conducted crimes which make their deportation 
personally justified.114 However, the ECtHR has strictly forbidden the 
consideration of such arguments in Article 3 analyses, in favor of a broader 
approach to the absolute right, holding that potential harm is sufficient to 
find an Article 3 violation and the wrongdoings of an applicant are 
irrelevant.115 Yet, the mere fact that no cases have reached the potential harm 
threat to Article 3 alone suggests that the Court is improperly weighing the 
facts of these cases. It is no coincidence that the more tenuous the link 
between the alleged ill-treatment and the conduct of State authorities, the 
 
 114 See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶¶ 120–122 ; Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
14038/88 at ¶ 12. 
 115 Id. 
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higher the threshold of risk assessment applied by the Court for the purposes 
of establishing the responsibility of the returning State under Article 3.116 
This argument is furthered by the fact that the ECtHR has continually 
taken other improper considerations into account during their Article 3 
analysis. N. v. U.K. itself serves as one of many examples of this, as the 
Majority in this case factored into its decision the burden on the health care 
systems of expelling states in Article 3 health cases.117 Evidently, the ECtHR 
is incorrectly conducting more of an Article 8 balancing test rather than 
appropriately awarding the absolute rights promulgated in Article 3.118 A 
more suitable analysis of Article 3 as an absolute right, however, should not 
consider the cost or burden to the Expelling State. In nevertheless doing so, 
the Dissent acknowledged that the Majority was relying on a principle to 
Article 3 case law that had since been overturned.119 The Majority referenced 
Soering’s finding that “inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search 
for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights [ . . . ].”120 However, this balancing of States’ economic 
interests against an individual’s rights was overruled in Saadi v. Italy.121 The 
 
 116 Andrea Saccucci, The protections from removal to unsafe countries under the ECHR: not all that 
glitters is gold, QIL (July 14, 2014),http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-protection-from-removal-to-unsafe-
countries-under-the-echr-not-all-that-glitters-is-gold/. 
 117 The dissent in N. v. U.K. pointed to this same problem in the case law, in stating “the view 
expressed by the majority that such a finding “would place too great a burden on the Contracting 
States” . . . reflects the real concern that they had in mind: if the applicant were allowed to remain in the 
United Kingdom to benefit from the care that her survival requires, then the resources of the State would 
be overstretched.” N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); see also S.J. v. Belgium, 
App. No. 70055/10 at ¶ 7 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., dissenting) (similarly alluding to the improper 
consideration of the financial burden of the expelling State in holding, “[N] clearly distorts the reasoning 
behind Article 3 of the Convention, by watering down the legal force of that provision on the basis of 
purely speculative assumptions regarding both the future care and support that seriously ill persons will 
receive from the national authorities in the receiving State and the economic burden they represent for 
the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. Its reasoning is an argumentum ad consequentiam, which considers 
that the disadvantages of a course of action based on a certain legal solution outweigh its advantages.”). 
 118 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 7, 100, 120. 
(“When it comes to access to health services, the Court has been cautious to extend Article 8 in a manner 
that would implicate extensive State resources because in view of their familiarity with the demands made 
on the healthcare system as well as with the funds available to meet those demands, the national 
authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment than an international court.”); See, e.g., 
Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 14462/03, 15 (April 1, 2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67997. 
 119 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 7 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“we also strongly disagree with 
the highly controversial statement made by the majority in paragraph 44 of the judgment in the context 
of the non-derogable right of Article 3[ . . . ]”). 
 120 Id. at ¶ 44. 
 121 Id. at ¶ 7 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“the balancing exercise in the context of Article 3 was clearly 
rejected by the Court in its recent Saadi v. Italy [ . . . ], confirming the Chahal judgment [ . . . ]”). 
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courts’ continued reliance on outdated principles suggests that its overly 
stringent application of Article 3 to cases of deportation arises from a general 
consideration of improper factors. There can be no derogation to the 
protections afforded by Article 3, period.122 If the court does take social and 
economic factors into account, it may only do so in its attempt to make the 
safeguards of Article 3 both “practical and effective” for the applicant by 
considering the social and environmental factors giving rise to the risk of ill-
treatment, as was seen in B.B. v. France.123 Thus, given this well-established 
Article 3 case law, continuing to follow the outdated approach to Article 3 
health cases would be contrary to the absolute nature of Article 3.124 
Finally, and most importantly, the ECtHR improperly ignored half of 
the reasoning provided by the Court in D. v. U.K. For years, the ECtHR’s 
application only gave substantial weight to the “very exceptional 
circumstances” language provided in the 1997 opinion. However, D. v. U.K. 
also stipulated in the very same sentence that the “compelling humanitarian 
considerations at stake” assisted the Court in arriving at its conclusion.125 
Therefore, the ECtHR in D. v. U.K. was clearly attempting to provide 
broader protections than what was afforded to applicants in subsequent 
cases. 
Following this, it makes sense that national courts subsequently applied 
the incorrect Article 3 health standard for many years. However, these courts 
separately erred in refusing to apply the appropriately slackened Paposhvili 
standard. First and foremost, sticking with N. v. U.K. fails to recognize the 
establishment of the ECHR as a “living document.”126 Despite the language 
 
 122 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15(2). 
 123 B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165, at ¶¶ 37–39. 
 124 Saccucci, supra note 112, at 17-18 (“One may arguably wonder how an absolute prohibition can 
be guaranteed only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ and how the higher evidentiary threshold required in 
cases where the source of the risk is not directly attributable to the authorities of the receiving State can 
be considered in line with the alleged non-derogability of the protection against removal as conceived by 
the Court in Saadi (where it stated that the protection afforded by Article 3 ECHR does not allow for a 
higher standard of proof to be required in order to establish the risk of ill-treatment in case of removal)”); 
ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at ¶ 4.9 (Recall that the absolute nature of Article 3 has been 
seen as an essential “safety net” particularly in cases of deportation.). 
 125 D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 54. This is especially true considering the structure of the 
relevant sentence, in that there is an ‘and’ between the two individual reasonings prior to a comma. This 
suggests that the court considered both the “very exceptional circumstances of this case” and “the 
compelling humanitarian considerations at stake” to factor into their decision that removing the applicant 
would be a violation of Article 3. 
 126 Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, (July 28, 1999), at ¶ 101(finding “certain acts which 
were classified in the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be 
classified differently in the future.”); APT Guide, supra note 12, at 41 (Thus, the Court is not bound to 
follow its previous decisions, but is free to re-evaluate case law and extend the scope of Article 3 to acts 
which had not previously been regarded as torture or ill-treatment.). 
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of their domestic law,127 national courts cannot just allude to a domestic 
provision to avoid applying a new standard from the ECtHR. The ECtHR’s 
holding in Paposhvili presented the United Kingdom with a relaxed standard 
to follow and a more lenient application, which was more aligned with the 
intentions of the “humanitarian considerations” of D. v. U.K. in Article 3 
health cases.128 The national courts are thus required to abide by this. 
Separately, the U.K. national courts reason that N. v. U.K. is the “clear and 
constant line” drawn by the ECtHR; however, N. v. U.K. was arguably not 
clear at all considering that the ECtHR in Paposhvili, and many scholars 
since, explained why the previous Article 3 health case law (i.e. the 
“deathbed analysis”) is actually inconsistent with the earliest decisions.129 By 
undermining the justifications arising from the early ECtHR Article 3 health 
cases, the Court in Paposhvili inserted doubt as to whether the subsequent 
case law was clear on this matter,130 and it is thus unlikely that such a stream 
of case law could meet the level of clear and constant required by the United 
Kingdom national statute. Paposhvili, on the other hand, did outline factors 
for national courts to weigh in applying Article 3 to deportation cases of 
persons in poor health,131 which better align with the original relaxation of 
Article 3 in D. v. U.K. and B.B. v. France. Still, the ECtHR needs to move 
beyond Paposhvili’s slight relaxation of the actual language used in the N. v. 
U.K. standard to create a standard that better reflects the lenient application 
found in Paposhvili. 
In further clarifying the Article 3 health standard, the ECtHR should 
take the following suggestions into consideration. First, while the case law 
popularly suggests that there are only two groupings consisting of (1) torture 
and (2) inhuman or degrading treatment, there is in fact reason to believe that 
these groupings should be analyzed as three separate items.132 While the 
practice of Article 3 indicates we should treat these as two separate 
components, the language of the provision itself suggests we treat them as 
three separate features, each with their own minimum level of suffering to 
 
 127 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] EWCA Civ 1369 at 8 (“in the absence of some 
special circumstances, [it seems to me that the court should] follow any clear and constant jurisprudence 
of the [European Court of Human Rights.]”). 
 128 This has since been affirmed in Savran v. Denmark, as well. 
 129 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 181–82; see, e.g., Virginia Mantouvalou, N v 
U.K.: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?, 72 Mod. L. Rev. 815 (2009). 
 130 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 181–82. 
 131 Id. at ¶¶ 189-90. 
 132 See, e.g., Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 100 (“Treatment has been held by the Court to 
be both “inhuman” because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and “caused, if not 
actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering”, and also “degrading” because it was 
“such as to arouse in [its] victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.”). 
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be met. Specifically, the word “or” between “inhuman” and “degrading” 
suggests that there are two different standards, whereas the inclusion of ‘and’ 
there instead would have grouped these two together. This diction was 
intentional and indicates there are actually three categories referenced in 
ECHR Article 3, with different thresholds. . In recognizing this and 
broadening what constitutes torture, “inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” the Court would not only provide better protection in Article 3 
health cases but more adequate protections across the board. It would follow 
from this adjustment that any Article 3 health case that doesn’t meet the 
necessary requirements for the high threshold of torture would most 
definitely meet either a standard of “inhuman” or “degrading” treatment. 
Additionally, this degradation moves beyond one’s deathbed. Ultimately, 
pairing these two together does the ECHR provision a disservice by raising 
the level of suffering necessary to meet both of those prohibited treatments. 
Even if one argues that the effect is the same, it definitely would not be in 
cases of poor health, as sick people are already in a most vulnerable state. 
Not allowing individuals the treatment necessary and forcing them to live a 
life deprived of the little dignity they may possess would likely be inhuman 
or degrading. 
The Court in Paposhvili also added that if there remains “serious 
doubts” regarding the impact of removal following the States’ assessment, 
then the returning State “must obtain individual and sufficient assurance 
from the receiving State that appropriate treatment will be available and 
accessible on return.”133 The Court should clarify two points on this portion 
of the standard, though: first, it should explain what it means by “individual 
and sufficient assurance,” and second, it should declare whether such 
assurance constitutes a mere factor or an end to the matter. In regard to the 
appropriate assurances, this essay recommends referring to Saadi v. Italy and 
Savran v. Denmark.134 
B. Other Legal Implications: ECHR Articles 2 and 8 
This subsection addresses the application of ECtHR Articles 2 (right to 
life) and 8 (right to privacy and family life) to Article 3 health cases, arguing 
that the ECtHR needs to explore all claims presented in these cases involving 
 
 133 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 191 (emphasis added). 
 134 Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27, 148 (“even if, as they did not do in the present 
case, the Tunisian authorities had given the diplomatic assurances requested by Italy, that would not have 
absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical 
application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment 
prohibited by the Convention . . . The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, 
in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time.”); see also Savran v. Denmark, App. 
No. 57467/15 at ¶¶ 43–67 (dealing with the sufficient assurance issue from Paposhvili.). 
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sick individuals facing deportation, as these claims present different and 
separate protections. 
1. Article 2 and the Right to Life 
To begin, the ECtHR’s regular dismissal of Article 2 claims by dealing 
with them under the structure of Article 3 is improper, despite the courts’ 
supposed inability to “dissociate” the two claims from one another.135 The 
right to life in Article 2 implicates a number of distinct notions from Article 
3, including a stronger connection to Article 15 in its explicit prohibition of 
the death penalty across international law.136 Guidelines on the interpretation 
of Article 2 state that unless during wartime, a sentence having the effect of 
the death penalty would be in violation of Article 15.137 Presented with this 
understanding, Article 2 may prove useful in cases where a claimant can 
argue that the “serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of 
health resulting in intense suffering or . . . a significant reduction in life 
expectancy” standard from Paposhvili essentially results in a death sentence 
upon deportation.138 Considering any sentence having the effect of the death 
penalty violates Article 15 and one’s right to life, accordingly, the dismissal 
of Article 2 out of pure convenience is improper. 
Similarly, the case law of Article 2 presents a separate basis for not 
deporting individuals of Article 3 health cases. For instance, combining the 
concepts found from Oyal and McCann, an applicant of an Article 3 health 
case can separately argue that the expelling State’s intentional act of 
deporting a seriously ill individual, knowing that doing so will risk the life 
of the individual, is “beyond that which was absolutely necessary.”139 While 
Oyal referred to omissions of the offending State, the ECtHR has found both 
 
 135 S.C.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 46553/99 at 6 (“The Government consider that there is nothing to 
indicate that the expulsion of the applicant would amount to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. 
In any event, the Government find it difficult to dissociate the complaint raised under Article 2 from the 
substance of her complaint under Article 3. They therefore deal with the substance of her complaints 
under the latter provision.”); see also Giuliana and Gaggio v. Italy, App. No. 23458/02, ¶ 174 (Mar. 24, 
2011), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0363c3/pdf/ (“Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental 
provisions in the Convention, one which in peace time, admits of no derogation under Article 15.”). 
 136 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 15; Protocol 13, supra note 72; ECtHR Article 15 Guide, supra note 72, 
at ¶¶ 28-30. 
 137 ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 2, 72-75.To provide a brief background, Article 15 
did away with death penalty sentences outside of wartime and then ECHR Protocol 13 established the 
complete abolition of the death penalty. In doing so, it strengthened the absolute nature of Article 2’s 
right to life, which, much like Article 3, was founded in Article 15. See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 15(2) 
(“No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from 
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.”). 
 138 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 183. 
 139 McCann v. U.K., App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 148-175 (Sept. 27, 1995), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943. 
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acts and omissions to apply to States’ obligations under Article 2.140 Finally, 
Article 2 can at the very least separately support an argument that ECHR 
violations involving potential risks, which have not yet materialized, equate 
to a finding where the violating harm had indeed surfaced.141 Ultimately, a 
separate review of Article 2 may stand as a significant safety net for ECHR 
protection in Article 3 health cases, especially considering the recent 
broadening of the right to life in the international dimension.142 
On the other hand, the distinctions between Article 2 and Article 3 are 
not the only reasons why the ECtHR should undergo a full analysis 
regardless of its Article 3 finding. Article 3 does not need to be completely 
removed from a proper analysis of Article 2, as “[t]ogether with Article 3, it 
enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the 
Council of Europe.”143 In fact, pairing these two Articles with Article 15 
helps uphold the true purpose of their existence, which underlies the 
ECtHR’s clear respect for an individual’s dignified life. Therefore, rather 
than severely limiting the applicability of Articles 2 and 3, individuals are 
deserving of the most available protections from them. In cases of any doubt, 
such as the ones presented in the ECtHR’s Article 3 health cases, courts 
should err on the side of caution for an individual’s life. With this said, the 
ECtHR’s dismissal of Article 2 suggests that such an argument would not 
stand in the Court. 
2. Article 8 and the Right to Privacy and Family Life 
While the ECtHR most often considers Article 8 in connection with 
Article 3 health cases, it almost always comes to the same conclusion it finds 
in the Article 3 analysis and presents little substantive analysis on the matter. 
This suggests that the ECtHR is currently misrepresenting the unique 
contributions that an Article 8 claim can play in these cases.144 From the plain 
language of the protections of Article 8 alone, it appears incredibly relevant 
in Article 3 health cases, as they involve impediments on an individual’s 
 
 140 ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at ¶ 36. 
 141 R.R. and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 19400/11 at ¶¶ 28-29 . 
 142 U.N.H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018); Lucy 
McKernan and Bret Thiele, UN Human Rights Committee Brings New Vitality to the Right to Life, 
OpenGlobalRights (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.openglobalrights.org/un-human-rights-committee-
brings-new-vitality-to-the-right-to-life/ (ensuring the protection of a right to enjoy a life with dignity). 
 143 Giuliana and Gaggio v. Italy, App. No. 23458/02 at ¶ 174. 
 144 See, e.g., N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 26 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“While it is 
understandable that the Court, in its case-law, has refrained from examining a second complaint – 
concerning the same facts – when the first has given rise to a finding of a violation, it is certainly strange 
for the Court to be using the laconic form of words ‘it is not necessary to examine the complaint under 
Article 8 of the Convention’ after finding that there was no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.”). 
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“right to physical and psychological integrity” and often affect one’s right to 
personal development and the development of certain relationships falling 
within the protected “sphere.”145 That said, Article 8’s strongest distinction 
from Article 3 is the significant role it can play in the protections of one’s 
quality of life, especially considering other articles are specifically 
unconcerned with this.146 
While Pretty v. United Kingdom – the case announcing Article 8’s 
devotion to the quality of life – was about medical futility, it is similar in 
nature to many of the Article 3 health cases whose applicants are also 
“suffering from the devastating effects of a degenerative disease which will 
cause [his or] her condition to deteriorate further and increase [his or] her 
physical and mental suffering.”147 Recognizing this, it would follow that 
Article 8 could serve as a valuable tool to argue that the ECtHR’s reasoning 
in Pretty similarly applies in Article 3 health cases, in that “the way [the 
applicant] chooses to pass the closing moments of [his or] her life is part of 
the act of living, and [thus, applicants have] a right to ask that this be 
respected.”148 Ultimately, Article 8 warrants a separate, in-depth review, 
regardless of any prior finding on Article 3. 
C. Article 5 and the ACHR 
The final conclusion drawn from the research above relates to this 
article’s attempt to propose a more appropriate standard for the ECtHR’s 
application to Article 3 health cases. As such, this section recommends that 
the ECtHR shift closer toward the ACHR approach to the corresponding 
Article 5 health cases. In doing so, the ECtHR will merely further its initial 
stride toward the ACHR standards by reintroducing a purposive element into 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 65 (“The very essence of the Convention is respect for 
human dignity and human freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected 
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take 
on significance.”); Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 39. (“Article 2 of the Convention is phrased in 
different terms. It is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of living or what a person chooses to 
do with his or her life.”); see also H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 
30, 2018);McKernan & Thiele, supra note 138. 
 147 Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 64. 
 148 Id. at ¶ 64. While this case used the medical technology argument to develop a case against 
remaining alive, it can be argued in the reverse to show that people should be allowed the chance to utilize 
this medical technology for the advancement of their physical or mental state. However, this argument is 
admittedly rather weak. Id. at ¶ 65 (the court also provided, “In an era of growing medical sophistication 
combined with longer life expectancies, many people are concerned that they should not be forced to 
linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly 
held ideas of self and personal identity.”). 
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a finding of torture through practice.149 Applied in the context of Article 3 
health cases specifically, this essay recommends making the distinction 
between treatment and punishment, as was seen in Andrea. Doing so would 
likely allow the comparable case law in the ECtHR to more accurately apply 
the court’s recognition of an applicant’s criminal convictions. While 
increasing the protections available to ECHR Article 3 applicants, it provides 
more specificity for the Paposhvili guidelines. Furthermore, the courts’ 
finding that the deportation “may well be fatal” supports the arguments 
presented in Article 2 and Article 8’s application regarding the death 
sentence.150 Finally, doing so will better align with the European policies on 
the right to health.151 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many potential areas to expand upon from this article since 
this topic is relatively unexplored in the legal arena today. To start, in future 
research, it is recommended that scholars further expand the comparative 
analysis in this essay to include the case law of the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. Doing this will allow for a better understanding of the 
impact that an explicitly recognized right to health can have on a society, as 
Africa also recognizes a right to health in Article 16 of its actual convention. 
Second, following the ECtHR’s hopeful adjustment in fully analyzing all 
claims presented in Article 3 health cases, scholars can begin to analyze the 
true effect that Articles 2 and 8 have on these cases. It would also be helpful 
to explore the potential role of Article 14152 regarding non-discrimination in 
such cases since health has been deemed a “status” subject to 
nondiscrimination protections153 and these cases often involve HIV positive 
individuals, whom have been declared a vulnerable group in society.154 
 
 149 See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶¶ 97–98; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 
24351/94 at ¶ 313; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16. 
 150 For instance, they may prove useful in cases where a claimant can argue that the “serious, rapid 
and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant 
reduction in life expectancy” standard from Paposhvili essentially results in a death sentence upon 
deportation. Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 183. 
 151 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 35, 2007 O.J. C 303/01 [hereinafter 
Charter of Rights] (stating “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to 
benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high 
level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union 
policies and activities). 
 152 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 14. 
 153 V.A.M. v. Serbia, App No. 39177/05, ¶ 114 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
79769. 
 154 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 64 (Mar. 10, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
103904 (finding a violation of Articles 14 and 8 when an applicant was refused residency due to his HIV 
diagnosis, taking into account the applicant’s membership of a “particularly vulnerable group”); I.B. v. 
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Eventually, this will adjust the analysis from the other legal implications 
section above to include Article 14 alongside Articles 2 and 8. This is a 
favorable development, considering “[h]ealth-related cases brought before 
the [ECtHR] have most frequently been argued under Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 
of the Convention.”155 
Finally, it would be helpful to broadly explore the ECtHR’s role in 
supporting the progression of the European right to health through its case 
law.156 In doing so, legal scholars should more closely explore the different 
health distinctions created in the Article 3 health cases. For one, an 
examination of the role that mental health plays in ECtHR decisions and how 
the court’s treatment of mental health has changed over the years, might help 
expose the type of illnesses and treatments the ECtHR is looking to protect 
over others. Given that nearly forty percent of all Europeans today suffer 
from mental health illnesses, Europe’s cultural perspectives on and social 
commitments to mental healthcare have drastically changed.157 Even the 
European Commission has recognized this clear shift to focusing on mental 
health by requesting that “mental health . . . be considered as a public health 
priority due to the heavy burden it places on the EU and its Member 
States”.158 Following this declaration, major policies were implemented for 
the recognition and improvement of mental health issues.159 Determining 
what roles this might play in ECtHR case law could further the analysis of 
this essay. Additionally, there might be a stronger argument available after a 
 
Greece, App. No. 552/10, ¶ 80 (Mar. 10, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-127055 (recognizing 
that “people with HIV have to face a whole host of problems, not only medical but also professional, 
social, personal and psychological, and to confront deeply rooted prejudice even from among highly 
educated people [ . . . ]. The prejudice was born out of ignorance about the routes of transmission of 
HIV/Aids, and has stigmatised and marginalised those who live with the virus. Consequently, the Court 
has held that people living with HIV are a vulnerable group and that the State should be afforded only a 
narrow margin of appreciation in choosing measures that single out this group for differential treatment 
on account of their health status.”). 
 155 Thematic Report, supra note 66, at 5. 
 156 See generally ANNIEK DE RUIJTER, EU HEALTH LAW & POLICY : THE EXPANSION OF 
EU POWER IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE (2019); Charter of Rights, supra note 147, at 
art. 35, (stating “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from 
medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human 
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 157 Kate Kelland, Nearly 40 percent of Europeans suffer mental illness, Reuters (September 4, 2011), 
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suffer-mental-illness-idUSTRE7832JJ20110904. 
 158 European Commission, The State of Mental Health in the European Union (2004), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_projects/2001/monitoring/fp_monitoring_2001_frep_06_en.pdf. 
 159 European Commission, Policies and practices for mental health in Europe (2008), available at 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/280604/WHO-Europe-Mental-Health-Acion-Plan-
2013-2020.pdf. 
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more in-depth study of the different types of physical illnesses (e.g. chronic 
versus fatal illnesses of AIDS, cancer, kidney disease, etc.) and their various 
treatments (e.g. minimally versus highly invasive procedures, medicine 
versus machinery). Providing actual data on how the court has ruled in these 
cases and what they have specifically said about the illnesses and treatments 
at hand might support a more specific and clear approach to Article 3 health 
cases which differentiates according to the disease at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Paposhvili shows that the ECtHR once again appears to be 
loosening its standard for Article 3 health cases in attempting to provide 
greater protections to those threatened with deportation to a State where he 
or she would receive inadequate health care.160 This article shows the need 
for the court to adjust this standard in a consistent and lenient manner. Given 
its historical application of Article 3 as an absolute right, the additional 
protections provided by Articles 2 and 8 in these cases, and the comparably 
greater protection provided by the IACtHR under the ACHR, the ECtHR and 
the national courts bound by its decisions should be encouraged to actually 
provide the absolute protection to its citizens from torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment that Article 3 alludes to. Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned courts, through their precedent, have instead effectively 
narrowed the initially protective standard created in D.v. U.K. – and now 
clarified in Paposhvili – so extensively that the limitations on the protective 
standard have begun to swallow the overall intentions of the rule, which was 
meant to protect sick and vulnerable individuals under “very exceptional 
circumstances” with “compelling humanitarian considerations at stake” from 
inhuman treatment.161 
This essay concludes that (i) the ECtHR has incorrectly applied Article 
3 to cases of poor health and deportation in the past, (ii) the ECtHR still 
needs to further clarify an appropriate standard for these cases, (iii) the 
national courts, particularly in the United Kingdom, are incorrectly 
following old precedent, (iv) the ECtHR needs to explore all claims 
presented to it in Article 3 health cases, especially claims of Article 2 and 8 
violations, and (v) the ECtHR should shift more toward the American 
Convention on Human Rights approach to Article 3 health cases in better 
aligning with the European policies on the right to health. Ultimately, in 
addressing these concerns, the referenced courts might finally fill the vast 
protection gap that exists in Article 3 health cases today. 
 
 160 With the first time this occurred being the D. v. U.K. case in 1997. 
 161 D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 54. Consider, for instance, the fact that the ECtHR has only 
provided protection in two cases over the course of twenty years. 
